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Abstract
This paper seeks to address the important role of public and private interests in protecting
critical infrastructure in Southeastern Europe, providing examples from Serbia. While the public
sector does have a role in protecting critical infrastructure needs, it is the private sector which
holds major oversight of the critical infrastructures of the region, therefore having an important
role in maintaining their functionality and protection. The literature in this field argues for more
collaboration and information sharing between the public and private sectors of the region,
though the task is not as simple as it appears given the varying aspirations of each country and
their approaches to critical infrastructure protection and designation. The main argument of this
paper calls for tailored approaches to public and private sector cooperation in each country with
some oversight from a regional agency meant for general guidance. The tailored approach
provides for a more effective solution as it considers the needs of each individual country, looks
at the existing situation in each country, and provides for more effective collaboration between
public and private sectors. For this paper, field experts also provided an overview of the current
cybersecurity situation in the region, the roles of public and private sectors, and what can be
done moving forward. This information serves to explain the main argument and why the
tailored approach is needed to improve the state of cyber critical infrastructure in the region in
light of current and emerging threats, which are also discussed.
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I. Introduction
Today’s society is highly interconnected thanks to evolving technologies and
infrastructures, consisting of physical structures, servers, and networks transmitting information
from one point to another. This is all important given that in today’s world, the high level of
integration means that the functionality of network systems and its components is paramount.
Without adequate means of security, protection, and adaptation, these physical and virtual
structures are left vulnerable to various forms of attacks, ranging from attacks on physical
structures to cyberattacks meant to cause disruption of the structure(s). This issue requires more
attention when it comes to the critical infrastructure (CI) of a country, physical or virtual, which
is also vulnerable to such forms of attacks that individuals, state, non-state actors, or
state-sponsored actors can conduct. The effects of attacks vary by region, by sector(s) affected,
and types of motivation behind the attack, but in general, attacks on CI have disruptive effects,
and in an increasingly interconnected world, this is becoming a major challenge for states,
corporations, and other entities affected.
The region of focus is Southeastern Europe, a strategic location for the United States,
China, Russia, and Turkey. Here, these states are involved to varying extents seeking to promote
their respective interests, such as Turkey collaborating with local partners in Bosnia Herzegovina
or China negotiating with Serbia and Montenegro to expand its Belt and Road Initiative
infrastructure projects. For countries such as the United States, China’s developments are of
major concern, particularly when it comes to the promotion of human rights and democracy.
Likewise, Russian regional involvement has also been a challenge, in terms of political and/or
economic involvement. In recent years, there have also been several cyberattacks in North
Macedonia and election infrastructure attacks in the region. It is important to note these issues
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given that the CI in these countries is still in development stages. More importantly, there is a
lack of adequate safeguards against cyber-attacks or attacks on physical networks by state,
non-state actors, or state-sponsored actors. With several external actors involved in the region, it
is easy for vulnerabilities to be exploited.
The overarching question of this project is the following: How can public and private
sectors in Southeastern European countries effectively cooperate to ensure the protection of
physical and cyber CI? It is understood that this form of collaboration will bring benefits to
cybersecurity (CS) and CI protection, but how exactly these partnerships are developed in the
region is equally as important to consider. The focuses of this paper are to understand the state of
CS in Southeastern Europe, including cyber and physical CI, the role of public and private
sectors and CI, and cooperation between both sectors, which is a common theme addressed in
interviews with experts and the literature.
I argue that a tailored approach to public and private sector cooperation in Southeastern
European countries, with a degree of oversight, is a more effective solution to improving the
state of cyber and physical CI. A degree of oversight means guidance from a regional
organization, however, the bulk of the work for CS and CI is done within a state’s context. For
example, in Albania, it would be the AKCESK agency. The literature does not discuss such
approaches for the region in-depth, however, other fields of study, such as the peacekeeping and
conflict intervention field, have proposed contextual approaches which are applicable to the CI
situation in Southeastern Europe. This paper serves to build on the existing literature that
proposes further cooperation between public and private sectors while arguing that each country
in Southeastern Europe will need a different strategy for effective solutions to improve the
security and protection of the current physical and cyber CI.
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The structure of this paper is as follows. The literature review will look at CS readiness
and the current discussions about public and private sector cooperation, followed by an
explanation of the research methodology. The terminology section looks at terms used in this
paper and definitions. The section “State of Cybersecurity in Southeastern Europe” provides a
broader overview of current security and protection measures of physical and cyber CI. The
section “Public and Private Interest Cooperation in Southeastern Europe” elaborates on existing
findings regarding cooperation between both sectors, arguing for a case-by-case approach in
Southeastern Europe. For “Current and Emerging Threats,” the discussion focuses on assessing
threats in Southeastern Europe. The final section provides conclusions.
II. Literature Review
Reports from organizations, such as DiploFoundation and DCAF, point out that CS and
CI protection in Southeastern Europe is not sufficient to protect from attacks that target CI.
However, there has been progress in recent years “in formally establishing the legal and
operational frameworks in most of the countries of the Western Balkans” (Minovic et al., 2016,
p. 22). A report by Popovska (2016) points out that different countries are at different
development stages of CS and CI measures. For instance, whereas Albania has “a national body
that deals with cyber security (formerly the National Security Computer Agency (ALCIRT) and
now the National Authority for Electronic Certification and Cyber Security (AKCESK)), Bosnia
lacks such a body dealing with these issues” (p. 27-28). Kosovo* is also in its early stages of CI
protection as it recently passed laws, directives, and measures focusing on CI, though more
initiatives are underway (Bund and Esteve-González, 2020, p. 36-38). Serbian institutions are in
a “Formative to Established” stage, including its national CS strategy, incident response (national
CERT), and CI protection (Herman and Avila, 2019, p. 23-33). It is clear that some countries
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have more developed CS and CI strategies, in part due to the lack of funding for CS and CI
projects, underinvestment in CI, the lack of newer infrastructure, and the national governments
having varying priorities.
In terms of public and private sector collaboration, it is agreed that it will benefit those
involved in it. For instance, at national and regional levels, these partnerships allow for “mutual
efforts in achieving the optimal level of security on the production, transport and distribution of
energy through the [CI] network” (Bardzieva, 2017, p. 78). Others explain that “Cybersecurity
involves public-private partnership as highlighted by policy initiatives and public statements on
the value of public-private partnerships” (Kruglov et al., 2019, p. 624). In the case of Serbia, the
rising “annual gross income of private security companies . . . from €10 million in 2001 to
approximately €26 million in 2003 and to €140 million in 2010 (according to official data from
the NBS Solvency Centre)” highlights the important role the private sector(s) have in protecting
CI (Davidovic et al., 2012, p. 61). The amount of resources the private sector has in comparison
to public sectors showcases the importance of public/private partnerships at national and regional
levels in order to effectively address CS and CI shortcomings. These discussions are central to
the paper, which include how to improve CS in the region and how to make PPP effective.
III. Research Methodology
The research methodology of this paper is as follows. Key information comes from
academic journals of different parts of the world and reports from organizations that focus on
CS, CI, or both. For instance, some sources are from Southeastern European academic journals,
institutes, and researchers who are involved in the region. These perspectives are important as
these provide important insight into the region’s developments on CI. I have also looked at
reports from organizations based in Geneva, Switzerland, such as DiploFoundation, which has
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released reports on Southeastern Europe CI and regional CS in recent years. I also use academic
sources from organizations and institutes in the European Union (EU) and the United Kingdom,
including the UK based Oxford Martin School: Global Cyber Security Capacity Centre.
Gathering these sources serves to complement and support the research findings and information
from experts I interviewed.
Part of the research methodology also included interviews from experts in the field or
related fields. These experts are from Geneva based organizations, such as DCAF,
DiploFoundation, and the CyberPeace Institute, who provided important context about the
general state of CS in Southeastern Europe, insight as to how public and private interests can
cooperate, and potential problems to address before such initiatives take place. These experts
also suggested additional resources for reference that have been useful for the main points and
arguments of the paper. Note that a majority of the data used for this paper is qualitative, and any
quantitative references come from sources cited for this project.
In all, the research methodology for this project is focused on obtaining qualitative data
as the project looks at the broader implications of CS and CI measures versus the quantitative
data specifics of CS. It is these broader implications, outcomes, and avenues of cooperation that
are the primary focus. By having sources from different organizations from different locations, it
provides for varying perspectives and opinions, all which are important to consider given the
emerging challenges that come with securing CI in a world where the digital and physical are
becoming increasingly interconnected.
IV. Terminology
One of the key terms of this paper is cybersecurity (CS), which encompasses various
aspects of protection, security, and adaptability in the digital world. Azmi and Kautsarina (2019)
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explain that “cyber” can be added to “space” and “security” to modify the term’s meaning (e.g.
“cyber space” and “cyber security”) and it can also be used “combined with its corresponding
domain,” such as cyberspace and cybersecurity (p. 22). In this paper, it will be used as the latter
given the interconnectedness of both terms in the context of CI. Additionally, Azmi and
Kautsarina (2019) note that the term “cybersecurity” is interchangeably used with “information
security” where the former focuses on organization and the latter refers to “collaboration to
address issues on security domains in cyberspace” (p. 23). For the purposes of this paper, CS will
focus on the latter points of Azmi and Kautsarina’s (2019) and in the context of CI protection,
though some aspects of “information security” are discussed where relevant. More about this
definition and what CI is is explored below.
Critical infrastructure (CI) is another important term. Its definitions can vary depending
on the region one considers as definitions have different considerations of what CI is in
European, Asian, African, and Asia-Pacific countries (Gallais and Filiol, 2017, p. 65).
Definitions also tend to be divided “into two parts. First there is the list of its components; and,
second, there are the consequences of its disruption, damage, or destruction” (Gallais and Filiol,
2017, p. 71). It is important to note that these definitions do not always include the “human
factor,” “intelligence perspective,” and “the critical infrastructure environment” (Gallais and
Filiol, 2017, p. 72). Definitions of CI can also be vague or non-specific. Such definitions are
“open-ended and . . . aimed to contain any infrastructure [where] its malfunction or loss
negatively affects the nation [providing] a general idea of what governments understand as
critical to their nations” (Harašta, 2018, p. 3). In other words, governments in Southeastern
Europe can have different definitions for CI depending on what they perceive as “critical.” For
the purposes of this paper, CI refers to the essential physical and virtual structures in which their
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security, protection, and functioning are imperative to a state and its society, where disruption,
natural or human-caused, will inhibit daily functioning. This definition does not focus on a
particular sector as CI can vary from place to place, as pointed out in explanations above.
In this paper, Southeastern Europe refers to the countries of Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina
(or Bosnia), Croatia, Kosovo*, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia. While some reports
use “Western Balkans,” this term does not encompass the full region, hence the use of
“Southeastern Europe.” This paper will mainly include information from Serbia given its role as
the dominant economy of the region, though information and developments from neighboring
countries will be included where relevant for comparison and insight into different security
strategies.
V. State of Cybersecurity in Southeastern Europe
The state of CS in Southeastern Europe is still in developing stages. Some countries have
laws targeting cyber crime and data protection, while others lack a concrete national agency
dealing with these issues. This section will provide a more detailed insight into the CS laws,
national and regional entities, and measures that are present or lacking in the region, using
reports from various organizations as a reference point, interviews with experts, and examples
from countries in the region. The country examples are Albania, Bosnia Herzegovina, Croatia,
and Serbia. I selected these countries given that Albania is in the process of EU membership,
Bosnia is not in the EU, Croatia is an integrated EU member, and Serbia is a regional economic
power. These countries also have varying progress on cybersecurity and CI protection, which
will serve to make comparisons among these countries and the region.
Abania’s CS readiness and CI protection includes several laws and a designated national
agency, AKCESK (formerly ALCIRT). These laws include “Law No. 9918, dated 19.05.2008,

Cruz 12
“On Electronic Communications in the Republic of Albania”, as amended; Law No. 9887, dated
10.03.2008, “On protection of personal data”, as amended; Law No. 2/2017 “On Cybersecurity”
(2017)” (DCAF, 2021, p. 4). These laws are meant to create a “safer, more reliable and more
sustainable cyberspace for citizens, business and government in support of economic and social
development” (DCAF, 2021, p. 5). This work dates to 2008 when Albania began its “National
Cross-cutting Strategy on Information Security (2008-2013) strategy [prioritizing CS and] the
creation of ALCIRT as the national institution for response to cyber-incidents” (Minovic et al.,
2016, p. 15). As a NATO member, Albania has also signed the Memorandum of Understanding
(MoU) (Minovic et al., 2016, p. 16). Furthermore, the country has adopted a new CS strategy for
2020-2025 addressing CI protection in the financial, health, energy, and transport sectors
(Decision No. 1084., 2020, p. 1484-1488). These action steps highlight the emerging challenges
of CS in the 21st century and the need to address them as soon as possible. Albania’s case
demonstrates the ever increasing priority these issues will need and how Albanian authorities are
targeting these issues.
Bosnia-Herzegovina’s institutions handling CS and CI include the “Ministry of
Communications and Transport of Bosnia and Herzegovina; Ministry of Security in Bosnia and
Herzegovina; Federal Ministry of Transport and Communications at Federal level; and Ministry
for Scientific-Technological Development, Higher Education and Information Society of
Republika Srpska” (DCAF, 2021, p. 9). There are laws dealing with different aspects of CS, such
as the “Law on Communications (2006); Law on Electronic Signature (2006); Law on Electronic
Business Transactions (2007)”, though overall, there is a lack of a comprehensive approach and
cooperation (DCAF, 2021, p. 9). This means that there is little information sharing between the
agencies and the laws are not adequately enforced. At the entity level, there is the “Department
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for Information Security within the Agency for Information Society of the Republika Srpska”
unit focusing on “computer security incidents and to supervise implementation of standards and
measures of information security” with little information about the other entities (Minovic et al.,
2016, p. 17). The Bosnian CS and CI protection framework is in its early stages, and there is a
notable lack of cooperation between the national organizations and regional entities that is
hindering crucial progress on this front, putting Bosnian CS and CI in a vulnerable position.
As a EU member, Croatia has adopted the EU framework on CS as part of its
membership, making its laws and regulations “compatible with the EU regulation” (Minovic et
al., 2016, p. 17). The country has its “government CERT called ZSIS-CERT, situated in the
Information Systems Security Bureau (ISBB) [which oversees] technical areas of information
security of [Croatian] state bodies” (Minovic et al., 2016, p. 17). These measures show a high
level of priority on addressing CS issues, which, in collaboration with the EU, gives Croatia an
advantage. There is also a National Cyber Security Strategy, adopted in 2015, which aims for “a
balanced and coordinated response of various institutions representing all the sectors of society
to the security threats in modern-day cyberspace” (Minovic et al., 2016, p. 18). Overall, there is a
high level of CS readiness in the country, which, if maintained, places Croatia in a strong
position on CS and CI protection measures. Croatia being a part of the EU also gives it a way to
receive additional assistance or advice on CS and CI measures.
Serbia is the regional economic power in the region, and its role is important when it
comes to CS and CI measures. It has taken steps to address CS and CI concerns, such as
establishing “legal and institutional framework . . . based on the Law on Information Security
[of] 2016” (Minovic et al., 2016, p. 21). Serbia also has a “National CERT hosted by the
Regulatory Agency for Electronic Communications and Postal Services (RATEL)” (DCAF,
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2021, p. 29). The goals of these measures include “enhanced operations of [important ICT
systems]; information security; increased capacities . . . against high-tech crime; [based on]
cooperation between the public and private sector, NGOs, the academic community and other
actors” (DCAF, 2021, p. 30). Signaling public and private sector partnerships (PPP) as part of its
goals is an important step towards general CS and CI measures as it can facilitate the sharing of
information, databases, and cooperation where necessary. Serbia also has a “formative to
established” CI protection capacity given its “[2018] Law on Critical Infrastructures, which
[identifies several] national critical sectors” (Herman and Avila, 2019, p. 30). Note that Serbia is
also in talks to obtain EU membership, meaning that these action steps outlined above are
essential to fulfill. For instance, in 2019, it amended “the Law on Information Security” to
include provisions of EU laws, essential to maintaining uniformity with the standards outlined by
the EU (Herman and Avila, 2019, p. 30). In all, Serbia is taking the steps to update and improve
CS and CI measures necessary for the well-being of the country’s CS and CI. EU membership
would also introduce Serbia to additional resources similar to other member countries.
CS and CI in Southeastern Europe is in need of greater prioritization. Dr. Vladimir
Radunovic, Director of cybersecurity and e-diplomacy projects at DiploFoundation, explained
that there is an awareness that CS and CI issues are becoming important in the region, but at a
practical level, these are not developed (Radunovic, 2021). There is also no clear understanding
of what is CI, CS, and telecommunications in part because there are no uniform definitions
(Radunovic, 2021). Dr. Franziska Klopfer, Principle Programme Manager in the Europe and
Central Asia Division of DCAF, adds that countries have different categorizations of what is CI,
some have laws but are undefined, and it is important to consider what are CI components in
each country (Klopfer, 2021). Junior Researcher Marija Pavlovic also adds that Southeastern
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European countries have a case-by-case development, with some still lacking measures and
others working on implementing measures (Pavlovic, 2021). CS and CI in Southeastern Europe
points to a lack of clarity in some countries, firm goals in others, some PPPs, and
national/regional agencies in countries present but not operating to their full potential. This is
where the role of PPP becomes key in improving the state of CS and CI in the region in
conjunction with national governments and relevant actors.
VI. Public and Private Sector Cooperation in Southeastern Europe
PPP can help improve the state of CS and CI in the region. How this will look like in
each country varies, which is why I argue for a case-by-case approach in the region. The next
section will provide an overview of PPP, its aspects, how exactly it benefits the actors involved,
and will elaborate on the argument presented, using Serbia as an example of how its PPP will be,
how these should be developed, and how the Serbian government can assist these efforts.
Public and private interest cooperation (also public private partnerships (PPP)) is
generally seen as beneficial. In this context, PPP involves public and private sectors
collaborating on a given project/topic (or several)in order to improve CS and CI. Roxana Radu,
research associate at the Geneva-based CyberPeace Institute, explained that in general, everyone
has a responsibility and collective action in these sectors; the public sector has an interest to
protect, and the government has a role of responding to these needs with the help of the private
sector (Radu, 2021). In addition, there must be a cyber resilience framework in a given country
by the government, though in some cases, governments impose more control of the process, must
meet a set government criteria, and in other cases, delegate this work to the private sector
companies (Radu, 2021). This is important given that the public sector “is the owner of some
part of the critical infrastructure systems or communication systems which is usually managed
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by private operators” (Limba, 2017, p. 561). Note that different private sectors may be better
prepared than others as is the case in Serbia; the energy, finance, and health sectors are more
prepared (Radunovic, 2021). PPP in Southeastern Europe will become increasingly important
given the degree of interdependence of CI and the different sectors, which can also happen
across borders.
My argument calls for tailored PPP approaches that consider a country’s context in order
to better meet its needs. Here, the “country’s context” refers to: the public and private sectors of
a country, what is designated as CI (to help better understand how PPP are shaped), existing PPP,
the role of a country’s government, followed by an analysis of these points. When these factors
are considered, it allows for more meaningful and concrete PPP that benefit CS and CI measures,
thus benefiting the broader population and state of CS. I then propose the creation of an
organization focused on CS and CI needs, composed of Southeastern European countries,
overseeing these efforts with member states then implementing CS and CI measures as relevant
to their situation(s).
The following paragraphs will look at the public/private sectors in Serbia and national
government roles. In Serbia, the public sectors are headed by the Ministry of Public
Communication, the Office for IT and E-Government, and the national CERT; the private sectors
are headed by companies such as Microsoft, IBM, and McAfee (Radunovic, 2021; Pavlovic,
2021). Some of the general sectors in Serbia include energy, finance, government, health,
telecommunications, with private companies having a major role in these sectors (Radunovic,
2021). Note that there is also not enough information about all the companies in the private
sector and information sharing with the public sector (Klopfer, 2021). These sectors are mainly
private-led, and they hold much responsibility for CS and CI measures, which makes their role
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essential in promoting CI protection and reinforcing CS. Given the different sectors of the
country, PPP in Serbia must focus on existing partnerships and build on these in order to develop
new partnerships, such as ensuring information security with Microsoft’s data servers and
controlled data access.
There are some variations as to how CI is approached and designated. In EU countries,
“it is obligatory to determine the supranational CI (on the European level). From the national
level upwards, the system stays similar – in most cases it is the national, regional, or local level”
[however] “there is a significant difference in the terminology used in individual countries [for
CI]” (Novotny et al., 2016, p. 167). While there are key CI sectors in Serbia, not everything is
defined. The country is still working to set concrete definitions of CI given that there is no single
authority that delegates what is CI (Radunovic, 2021). This puts Serbia in a vulnerable position
where the lack of clarity of what is CI becomes an issue in the face of threats. Several countries
in the region face similar issues, though Serbia is better positioned to handle them given the
existence of institutions that can take on these roles. In North Macedonia, its strategy involves
the creation of an agency dealing with computer incidents (MKD-CIRT) and the need to clearly
define CI “taking into account the various actors’ specific roles in the cyber domain – from
individuals to organizations and states” to attract private economic actors (Tasevski, 2015, p.
3-4). These situations in Southeastern Europe further call for country-by-country approaches
where each country can assess its needs and implement strategies accordingly: partnerships in
North Macedonia are likely to differ from those in Serbia.
Serbia has developed important PPP in the past years. One partnership involves
Microsoft, in which the company partnered with the National Ministry to create a data center in
Serbia on the Microsoft platform, considered one of the largest PPP in the region (Pavlovic,
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2021). The partnership involves cooperation on several key fronts, such as e-government, IT
office, information storing, and AI development (Pavlovic, 2021). This has been an important
partnership for the country as it involves the vast resources of the private sector being used to
create such initiatives. Another important partnership for Serbia and the region is the “Petnica
Group,” involving the “OSCE Mission to Serbia, DiploFoundation and [DCAF partnering with]
the Petnica Science Centre and organized a coordination meeting of key public and private
stakeholders in the field of cyber security,” therefore making it a broader regional partnership
(Rizmal, 2018, p. 41). The group also places an emphasis on policy making in Serbia, “[acting]
as a bridge between the technical community and policy decision makers [and] fostering a
platform for reaching proposals for joint solutions” (Rizmal, 2018, p. 42). Despite these
partnerships, there is still room for improvement. There must be more ways to involve the public
and private sector outside of these initiatives for trust building, cooperation, and each private
actor should have a system/action plan (Klopfer, 2021). For the case of Microsoft and IBM, it
would be having contingency plans in case of emergency and ways they can notify their public
sector partners, the national ministry, and the general public about CS and CI developments.
The national government’s involvement in PPP is also key in fostering collaborations and
maintaining current partnerships. In the region, governments can set up formal working groups,
become more open to policy shaping, open dialogue to stakeholders, and improve current PPP to
increase trust (Radunovic, 2021). Governments must also be willing to participate in taking these
action steps, relocate resources for the project, implement laws, and stray away from the notion
that CS is only a national security problem (Pavlovic, 2021). For Serbia, continuing further
investments into PPP, whether it is the public or private sector, is also key to the country’s overall
advancements on CS and CI. One case study notes that private companies make their investment
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decisions based on cost-benefits, cost-savings (or avoidance), and for CS measures, these
investments are made to avoid security breaches, creating a situation where companies
underinvest in CS (Gordon et al., 2014, p. 80-81). It then puts the private actors involved and
their supply chains in a vulnerable position where an issue at one point can cascade to another
and in some cases, greatly affect the private actor itself. How this happens depends on the
number of PPP in a country and the relationship between the public and private sector. In cases
where the relationship between these sectors is poor or there is low communication and
information sharing, more CS and CI vulnerabilities are likely.
Anne-Marie Buzatu, Vice President & Chief Operations Officer at the ICT4Peace
Foundation, adds that one way for governments to encourage private actors to implement action
plans, as pointed out by Klopfer (2021), is to have standards and requirements in contracts and
improve regulatory efforts (Buzatu, 2021). This task is easier with domestic companies, and in
the Serbian context, Microsoft and IBM are external private companies, making external actors
comply with local Serbian laws and regulations a challenge. Given that the public sector holds
much control over the key CI sectors and CS, the national government relies on the private sector
and works with it towards a cyber-resilience framework (Radu, 2021). These measures are
becoming more important in an increasingly interconnected world where the failure of one link
spells trouble for another or for an entire sector, and Serbia is no exception, and its partnerships
with organizations outside the country and national organizations for PPP highlight this.
The points above highlight the need for context-based approaches. Each country’s public
and private sectors differ, are defined differently, each country has different forms of PPP with
different companies, and each government will have different strategies to address CS and CI. As
pointed out in Novotny et al. (2016), there are no unitary strategies, even in the EU, much less
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outside of it (p. 167). Croatian approaches to CS and CI along with the development of these
institutions is different from that of France, Romania, and/or Germany. Novotny’s et al. (2016)
case-by-case approach considers the following information when assessing strategies for a
country: what is the criticality of each sector, the impact of its disruption on society, impact of its
disruption on other sectors or sub-sectors, and risk assessment (p. 167-168). For this to happen,
there must be a regional organization overseeing these efforts at a national level, similar to the
Regional Cooperation Council group, though focused on CS and CI. Henry (2010) proposed an
international organization “composed of [IT] security representatives from each signatory state,
and to task the organization with coordinating and collaborating joint security measures with
states and industries” (p. 17). A similar approach can be taken in Southeastern Europe where
there are representatives from the region’s countries that report to their respective countries and
implement CS and CI measures for their country.
This organization is to be headed by a combination of regional experts and outside
experts to provide a variety of perspectives. Each country has its representative(s), which serve
as advisers to their national governments and other entities, such as public/private sectors. Note
that the broader organization simply serves to provide guidance, information sharing, and
guiding cooperation between countries where applicable. For instance, it provides questions such
as those proposed by Novotny et al. (2016) for individual country representatives and their
governments to use to assess their CS and CI needs. In addition to points made by by Novotny et
al. (2016), the organization must also consider the disruption impact (structural, social,
economic, political) as a result of cyber attacks, data breaches, or ransomware, how other sectors
or sub-sectors are affected (their interdependence), costs of CS/CI investments vs. costs of
attacks, and risk assessments on a country’s critical sectors. This also helps governments in
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Southeastern Europe assess current and potential CI sectors in light of emerging CS threats and
CS measures. With these criteria combined, this organization is likely to be more successful
rather than having too broad of a focus and not providing a place for discussions.
VII. Current and Emerging Threats
Currently, Southeastern Europe faces different threats, which will evolve in the coming
years. During the current period of a global health crisis, cyber threats have gone up in the
region. For example, “all Western Balkan national CERTs have reported an increase of phishing
attacks [on] individuals . . . the health care sector [particularly government healthcare agencies]
e-commerce and e-businesses” (Achten, 2021, p. 4). Radunovic (2021) adds that the government
and health sectors can be vulnerable to personal data breaches. In Serbia, these threats are similar
as they include cyberattack exploitation, a high degree of disinformation, and ransomware
(Pavlovic, 2021). Moreover, human factors are also a key vulnerability where there are people
working on CI projects but lack security awareness/knowledge, software/hardware is not
updated, and the government not prioritizing CS and CI (Pavlovic, 2021). This can result in
personal data and other infrastructures being susceptible to attacks. One case of a cyber attack
happened in the Serbian city of Novi Sad where the institution’s information was encrypted, thus
leaving people unable to use its services (Pavlovic, 2021).
Note that Serbia is also participating in China’s Belt and Road initiative, involving
various projects that are “interdependent directly or indirectly [meaning that] serious problems in
one vital CI [sector] . . . could cause serial interruptions in linked [project structures in Serbia
and in the region]” (Todorovic, 2018, p. 254). The high level of interlinkage in the region is also
another area of potential threats that actors with malicious intent can exploit, which calls for
greater attention to national and regional CS and CI. There is also the lack of cooperation
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between institutions that will pose a problem. In the EU, several countries have various national
authorities “pursuing fragmented policies [with] significant lack of cooperation between national
governments and EU institutions [setting up coordinated emergency responses] to potential
threats [despite] interdependent . . . cross-border [CI]” (Gaiser, 2018, p. 50-51). This lack of
cooperation is also a vulnerability for non-EU members in the region given the interdependence
of infrastructure, making domestic and transnational cooperation essential. Lastly, the protection
o f election infrastructure, a key infrastructure in countries around the world, is not being
prioritized enough in Southeastern Europe. There have been notable attacks on election
infrastructure, as seen in the United States, Western Europe, and North Macedonia, affecting the
integrity of these systems, how people view them, and to varying extents, the functioning of their
respective governments. However, these trends are slowly changing around the world as more
countries begin to prioritize election infrastructure as critical (Radu, 2021). With this in mind,
national governments in Southeastern Europe will also need to incorporate election infrastructure
as part of CS and CI strategies. In general, current potential threats to the region include
cyberattacks such as phishing, ransomware, data vulnerability and breaches, disinformation, lack
of knowledge on CS, CI, the digital world, and lack of cooperation, threats which will evolve
over time.
To mitigate these risks, countries in Southeastern Europe have adapted awareness raising
via “informational materials,” public warnings along with country CERTs launching “education
aimed at young professionals in order to increase expertise in the region, and technical
capacity-building training of CERT staff” in the domestic context (Achten, 2021, p. 4-6). These
serve as ways to increase awareness of the threats the region’s countries are facing. CS and CI
PPP in the region are also another way to mitigate risks, both serving as initial steps in increasing
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protection from cyberattacks and CI attacks. The effects of these attacks must be understood to
find ways to protect from them, which means understanding how attacks work. While each cyber
attack will look differently from another, generally, cyber attacks involve identifying a
vulnerability, exploiting, payload, infection, and launching the attack (Limba et al., 2017, p.
563). Making this type of information widely available can also assist national campaigns in
further educating its population about the digital world, how cyber attacks happen, how to
protect oneself from one, and why it is important to implement robust CS and CI measures.
Cyber attacks also have consequences in the physical world given the high
interconnectedness of the physical and virtual components. These attacks can “take place quickly
to shock and avoid adaptive response [leading to a] loss of system control . . . situational
awareness, ineffective coordination, and [low confidence for a] government to mitigate the
damage” (Pfeifer, 2018, p. 30). In Southeastern Europe, where political tensions are high, trust in
governments is generally low, and where some countries have limited development and PPP,
such attacks would have ripple effects in one region to the rest given the interconnectivity of CI.
The types of attacks and their methods also depend on the final goal of intrusion and the social
aspects of the attack (Radu, 2021). For instance, an attack on a country’s energy sector disrupts
energy use in the affected region or country, and the goals of the attack may be for criminal,
political, social, economic, or military warfare motivations. Radunovic (2021) also pointed out
that in the case of Serbia, some XI sectors are better prepared to handle cyber attacks to its CI,
which means that CI sectors less prepared are more vulnerable to attacks or greater consequences
as a result. Note that cyber attacks on CI between states are not common, though their frequency
is likely to increase along with the scale of targeted attacks (Radu, 2021). This is because state
actors have “the most capable threat, as they have the ability to funnel significant resources and
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talents into these efforts” (Henry, 2010, p. 3). However, the role of non-state actors cannot be
disregarded. While they may not have as many resources as state actors and/or state-sponsored
actors, non-state actors can still pose substantial threats to states. For instance, these actors can
target different CI at once via coordinated cyber attacks, and with several small attacks, this can
overwhelm the national authorities’ response and untilatemy cause similar or higher levels of
disruption as a state-sponsored attack.
Something else to consider is the difficulty of tracing an attack to the perpetrator(s).
Responsibility can be more easily traced to state actors, but for non-state actors that operate
anonymously or across national borders, it becomes difficult for states to assign responsibility for
costly damages to CI and adequately respond given the use of fake IP addresses, pseudonyms,
and increasingly easy ways to destroy data that may trace to the identity of the perpetrator(s).
This highlights the importance of risk assessment by national governments and agencies. How
costly are cyberattacks per sector? What are the likelihoods of being cyber attacked by a state
actor versus a non-state actor? Can responsibility ever be attributed to an entity? National
governments in Southeastern Europe must assess these questions as they implement CS and CI
measures to consider the various types of threats that CI faces, which will only grow in the
coming years.
Despite the potential threats, there are ways to protect and increase existing robustness of
laws, CS and CI. One important point is to assume that systems are vulnerable, also referring to
the “Zero Day Vulnerability” (Klopfer, 2021; Buzatu, 2021). By assuming that systems are
vulnerable at all times, it allows for constant improvement and development of CS and CI in the
region; complacency can have major consequences. While there is now more general awareness
of the importance of CI and its vulnerabilities, governments, public and private sectors must also
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be transparent about their work. Sometimes, actors in these sectors do not announce
vulnerabilities to the public or government, stockpile them, or keep it a secret (Buzatu, 2021).
Not knowing this information makes it challenging to plan effective CS and CI strategies that
can further protect a country’s infrastructure and overall CS. For broader measures, domestic and
international cooperation on CS and CI must also be at the forefront of Southeastern European
governments. This can be done through agreements on protecting CI and defining standards for
information sharing, addressing complexities, and acknowledging shared risks (Henry, 2010, p.
15-19). Reducing complexities and facilitating cooperation among states will become
increasingly important in light of the growing complexities of attacks and protection measures.
To protect from threats, there must also be guarantees by states to look out for one
another. One of the proposals by the “Open Ended Working Group,” a group under the United
Nations Human Rights Council, has norms for states to not attack CI of another state and for
states to ensure that their CI is secure (Buzatu, 2021). Limba et al. (2017) proposes a CS
management model for CI that considers the following: legal regulation, good governance, risk
management, security culture, technology management and incident management, with initial,
moderate, and full integration levels of management (p. 566). This model incorporates various
important considerations for CS and CI measures that are lacking in Southeastern Europe. While
it is not the answer to all the problems, it provides a more robust response and approach to
address the region’s CS and CI shortcomings. These models must also address the roles of
non-state actors, which can also pose equal, if not, greater risks in terms of cyber attacks.
VIII. Conclusion
In sum, the general state of CS and CI in Southeastern Europe requires improvements in
how CS and CI needs are addressed. Some countries do not have a comprehensive strategy, and
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given the interconnectedness of CI in the region, it makes it susceptible to cyber attacks on CI.
While some sectors may be more lucrative targets for attackers, all sectors are vulnerable.
However, by implementing PPP in the region that addresses each country’s needs, the likelihood
of cyber attacks on CI will be reduced, though not completely gone. A regional organization
overseeing these efforts is necessary to ensure progress monitoring in the form of check-ins and
for general guidance, with the respective countries leading their focused efforts. As technology
continues to evolve, the organization’s role and the country’s PPP will also evolve, providing
ways to navigate an environment where attack perpetrators are increasingly difficult to track, act
alone or in coordination, and cause extensive damage. This is where trust building, information
sharing, transparency, and between governments and public/private sectors will become
essential in order for PPP to succeed and improve upon existing PPP.
Moving forward, the role of national governments will remain crucial in promoting new
PPP across different CI sectors. Not only that, but CI legislation will also have an important role
in advancing new proposals, amending current laws, and promoting digital awareness
campaigns. Moreover, adapting different types of awareness campaigns will serve more useful
than launching a single form of campaign, which also includes using different platforms to
disperse the messages. The private sector must also make use of its already important role in
promoting these efforts within the partnerships it has in Southeastern European countries and
across the region. These strategies and recommendations combined will not resolve the existing
and other underlying problems in the region, though it can pave the way for model-setting
initiatives that benefit the region’s countries’ current and future CS and CI measures.
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IX. Abbreviation List
ALCIRT – Agjencia Kombëtare për Sigurinë Kompjuterike (National Security Computer
Agency)
AKCESK – Autoriteti Kombëtar Për Certifikimin Elektronik Dhe Sigurinë Kibernetike (National
Authority for Electronic Certification and Cyber Security)
BCSP - Beogradski Centar za Bezbednosnu Politiku (Belgrade Center for Security Policy)
CERT – Computer Emergency Response Team
CI – Critical Infrastructure
CS – Cybersecurity
DCAF – Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (Democratic Control of Armed Forces)
EU – European Union
ISBB – Information Systems Security Bureau
IT – Information Security
KOSOVO* – “This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with
UNSC 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence.” This is borrowed
as found in Minovic et al. (2016).
MoU – Memorandum of Understanding
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NIS – Network Information Systems
OSCE – Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PPP – Public Private Partnership(s)
RATEL – Regulatory Agency for Electronic Communications and Postal Services
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